Do institutions rule when explaining cross-country divergence? By employing regression tree analysis to uncover the existence and nature of multiple development clubs and growth regimes, this paper finds that to a large extent they do. However, the role of ethnic fractionalization cannot be dismissed. The findings suggest that sufficiently high-quality institutions may be necessary for the negative impact on development from high levels of ethnic fractionalization to be mitigated.
Introduction
The recent empirical growth literature has seen serious attempts at evaluating the question of whether certain non-traditional growth determinants may be responsible for the observed divergence in the cross-country distribution of income (see, Quah, 1997, and Canova, 2004) . One characteristic of this literature has been the recasting of the growth process as a system that exhibits a "hierarchy of timescales" 1 whereby growth is determined by slow-and fast-moving variables.
In this view, the familiar neoclassical growth determinants (see, Solow, 1956, and Mankiw et al., 1992 ) -physical and human capital accumulation rates, and population growth rates -constitute the "proximate" determinants of growth while slow-moving variables such as a country's geography (e.g., Sachs, 1998, Gallup et al. 1999 ), the quality of its institutions (e.g., Hall and Jones, 1999, Acemoglu et al. 2001) , and the degree of fractionalization (e.g., Levine, 1997, Alesina et al., 2003) in its society are considered to be "fundamental" determinants.
The recent literature has seen much controversy over the relative empirical salience of these fundamental determinants to growth. Efforts to assess the evidence in favor of each of these fundamental theories have suffered from three related and important shortcomings. First, most studies argue from a priori positions that assume mono-causality. For example, in the highly contentious "institutions versus geography" debate (see, Rodrik et al., 2004 , Easterly and Levine, 2003 , Sachs, 2003 the aim is to test if institutions "rule" and, therefore, whether geography's importance is limited solely to its historical role in determining the initial quality of institutions that a country inherits at birth. Second, virtually all of the research assumes away substantial heterogeneity (e.g., interactions between theories) and nonlinearity across observational units. Attempts to resolve the institutions versus geography debate, for instance, have centered largely upon efforts to uncover partial correlations between various proxies for fundamental determinants with per capita income or conditional growth rates within a linear framework. Little attention has been paid in the literature to the question of whether the linear model adequately captures structure in the data. Finally, when researchers have paid attention to heterogeneity and nonlinearity, they have typically limited their investigation to a small number of alternative model specifications before settling on a particular specification that is then reported. Barro (1996) , for instance, focuses on the nonlinear effect of democracy on growth, but excludes other possible nonlinearities and interaction effects.
The combined outcome of the above strategy is to imply strong prior knowledge on the part of researchers about the correct (econometric) model for growth. Instead of taking into account the very large set of possible models that could be generated by accounting for possible nonlinearities and interactions between covariates, researchers essentially narrow their focus, a priori, to a very small number of alternative models. However, as pointed out by Brock and Durlauf (2001) , growth theories are fundamentally "open-ended". By open-ended, Brock and Durlauf mean that the fact that one theory (e.g., institutions) may be salient to growth does not automatically exclude some other theory or theories (e.g., geography or ethnic fractionalization) from also being important. It also does not exclude the possibility that their interaction may be important. The deep insight by Brock and Durlauf is that theory open-endedness implies uncertainty over the correct model specification for growth, and therefore, any assessment of the marginal impact of growth theories on economic performance needs to place the full universe of possible alternative models under consideration.
The main contribution of this paper is to address the question of model uncertainty within the nonlinear framework 2 . In this paper, I employ sample splitting and threshold estimation methods (notably, regression trees and Hansen's threshold regression) to identify important fundamental growth determinants as well as their salient interactions. Many growth theories suggest that the growth process may be characterized by threshold nonlinearities (see, for instance, Galor and Moav, 2002 , Galor, 2005 , Chamon and Kremer, 2006 . Sample splitting methods iteratively split the sample of observations into increasingly homogeneous subsets. At each stage, a threshold variable is chosen from the set of fundamental determinant proxies and a threshold value is determined to facilitate the splitting of the sample. The result of the iterative sample splitting procedure is to deliver groups of countries whose members share meaningful similarities in the way fundamental determinants influence economic outcomes without the need for us to impose any a priori structure on the number of these groups. The results are also structurally interpretable in the sense that they reveal the relative importance of particular fundamental determinants to countries in each of these groups.
The findings in the paper provide robust support for the view that institutions and their interaction with ethnic fractionalization are central to explaining cross-country economic divergence.
Higher levels of ethnic fractionalization have no impact on development for the group of countries with high quality institutions. For countries with quality of institutions below a threshold level, however, greater ethnic fractionalization is associated with substantially lower levels of development.
Sufficiently high-quality institutions are necessary to mitigate the negative impact on development from high levels of ethnic fractionalization. Interestingly, I find no role for geographic factors;
neither those associated with climate nor geographic isolation, in explaining divergence. There is also no evidence to suggest an important role for religious fractionalization. Finally, the findings in this paper affirm earlier work (e.g., Masanjala and Papageorgiou, 2007) in the literature that sets apart the development process of Sub-Saharan Africa from the rest of the world.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 of this paper provides an empirical framework for the discussion. I model the timescale effect of fundamental determinants on economic performance as a search for the existence of multiple development clubs and growth regimes. Section 3 describes the regression tree algorithm employed in this paper; i.e., Generalized
Unbiased Interaction Detection and Estimation (GUIDE). Sections 4 and 5 discuss the data and estimation results respectively. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Development Clubs and Growth Regimes
I model the influence of fundamental determinants on economic outcomes in two ways.
Development Clubs
I first consider the case where the dependent variable is the period ending level of per capita income (as opposed to the growth rate, which I consider in the next subsection). Hall and Jones (1999) have advocated the use of such levels regressions on the grounds that differences in long-run levels of income are the most relevant measures of welfare and suggest that the low correlation of growth rates across decades may imply that observed variations in cross-country growth rates may be mostly transitory. This levels regression approach also characterizes much of the literature in the "institutions versus geography" debate.
Our aim is to classify the long-run development levels of countries into groups defined by threshold values for fundamental determinants 3 . Formally, suppose there are b mutually exclusive partitions in the space of fundamental determinants, { }
and,
where Z is the space of fundamental determinants. As a simple example to illustrate how we would interpret thresholds in the space of fundamental determinants, let us suppose that fundamental determinants took on discrete values. So, suppose . That is, there is a "low quality institutions-high fractionalization" partition, a "low quality institutions-low fractionalization" partition, and a "high quality institutions" partition. Geography, in this example, is not salient in partitioning countries into groups. This example makes clear how partitioning the space of threshold variables potentially reveals both the importance of particular threshold variables as well as the role of interactions between threshold variables in characterizing heterogeneity.
Since we are only concerned with explaining levels of long-run development, the regression specification within each partition of the fundamental determinants space, j A , for b j ,..., 1 = , is therefore simply a (piece-wise) constant model corresponding to,
where i y is real per capita income for country i , and Z z i ∈ is the vector of values for fundamental determinants for country i . The number of development clubs in this case is b . One of the tasks of estimation will be to uncover the exact value of b .
extends their contribution by considering all three fundamental determinants; geography, institutions, and fractionalization.
Multiple Growth Regimes
Next, I explicitly model the effects of fundamental determinants in terms of their role in driving heterogeneity in production technologies. As opposed to the levels regression above, growth regressions are interpretable within the context of the (augmented) neoclassical growth model. In the context of this paper, growth regressions also allow us to relate our findings to those in the large literature on multiple growth regimes (e.g., Canova, 2004 , Desdoigts, 1999 , Durlauf and Johnson, 1995 , and Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Minkin, 2001 ).
We start formally with a model of the neoclassical production function for each country i
given by, ( )
where y is real per capita income, f ε is a neoclassical production function, k is a vector of per capita capital stocks that all depreciate at a common rate, δ , and z Z ∈ is the vector of fundamental determinants. If we assume further that the production function is Cobb-Douglas, then, following Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) , growth around each steady state would be given to a first order approximation by a growth regime such as
Here, i g is the difference in log per capita real GDP between the start and end years of a given time interval for country i , 
Regression Tree Analysis and Generalized Unbiased Interaction Detection and Estimation (GUIDE)
Our task is therefore to estimate the number of, respectively, development clubs or growth regimes, b , the threshold values and fundamental determinant choices that define the partitions,
, and the set of regression parameters associated with development clubs, { } Regression tree analysis provides a computationally efficient method for fulfilling this purpose 4 . Regression tree methods are standard in the statistical learning literature and bear deep similarities to recent sample splitting and threshold estimation methods in the econometrics literature (see, in particular, Hansen, 2000, as well as Gonzalo and Pitarakis, 2002) . Regression tree methods are appropriate tools for the job because they routinely handle the case of multiple threshold variables as well as multiple thresholds. They have also been shown to be consistent in the sense that as the number of observations gets large, regression trees reproduce the "true" set of sample splits (see Breiman, Friedman, Olsen, and Stone, 1984) . Their weakness, however, lies in the lack of available asymptotic results that would be useful for conducting inference on threshold variable choices and threshold value estimates. The econometrics literature has sought to correct this within the context of test-based sequential sample splitting models (see Hansen, 1999 , Hansen, 2000 . However, results such as confidence intervals derived in these settings are generally restricted to the single threshold variable-single threshold case. Nevertheless, our regression tree results (see Section 5) confirm that these inferential results are applicable in the multiple regimes context. I therefore also report results for confidence intervals for threshold estimates using Hansen's methodology in Section 5 below.
The specific regression tree algorithm I employ to uncover development clubs and growth regimes is GUIDE. Loh (2002) is the key reference. GUIDE is an extension of the Classification and Regression Tree (CART) methodology by Breiman et al. (1984) . GUIDE's innovation is to minimize potential biases in variable selection and interaction detection in CART. These biases arise because the "greedy" search algorithm employed by CART for tree splitting selects threshold variables with larger support points more frequently regardless of fit (see Doyle, 1973 Once a threshold variable has been selected, a threshold value is arrived at by finding a value for the threshold variable that minimizes the joint classical linear regression sum of squared errors across the resulting two subgroups. Parameters for the regression equation are estimated by concentration.
GUIDE then applies the above threshold selection procedure iteratively to each newly formed subgroup. At each stage, the given subset of observations is further divided into two subgroups. The procedure stops only after a pre-set value for the minimum number of observations in a subgroup has been breached. The result is the construction of an "overly large" tree. To deal with the problem of over-fitting, the overly large tree is then pruned back using a criterion, similar to a generalized information criterion, that maximizes overall fit while penalizing for complexity (i.e., the number of subgroups) to arrive at the final tree. show what a regression tree algorithm such as GUIDE accomplishes. In experiments, Loh (2002) shows that there is negligible bias in the selection of threshold variables. This provides some confidence in the interpretability of the uncovered structure in small samples. Loh also shows that GUIDE provides good out-of-sample prediction performance when compared to other machine learning algorithms across a wide range of data sets. In particular, with bootstrap aggregation, GUIDE provides the best predictive performance out of the set of learning algorithms that delivers interpretable structure (including multivariate adaptive regression splines (MARS)). The reader is referred to the Technical Appendix for details on the GUIDE procedure.
Data
The dependent variable for the development clubs regression is the log of per capita real purchasing power-adjusted GDP 5 for 1999 for each country. Since this is a piece-wise constant regression model, the independent variables are proxies for fundamental determinants (described below) that are used for tree-splitting. (DUM6079) is also included. The schooling variable corresponds to the "average years of secondary and higher level schooling for males aged 15 and above" calculated using data from Barro and Lee (2000) . All of the other national accounting data come from the recently released Penn World Table 6 .1 (PWT 6.1) dataset (see Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2002) . We turn now to data for geography, institutions, and fractionalization.
Following Diamond's (1997) seminal work, some growth economists have recently argued that disadvantageous geography has long-term consequences for a country's development. In particular, the impact of climate on agricultural productivity and disease ecology, and consequently on health, educational achievement, productivity, and the nature of policy regimes 7 , has taken on a (see, Frankel and Romer, 1999, and Radelet and . I use data (also from the CID) measuring the percentage of a country's land area within 100 km of an ice-free coast (LCR100KM) to proxy for geographic isolation 8 .
The case for the importance of economic institutions in affecting long-run growth and development outcomes arose to some extent as a response to this new "geographic determinism". A large number of studies 9 have shown that the quality of institutions has potentially crucial consequences for investment and productivity. It has also been posited that volatile macroeconomic policies, resulting in uncertainty in the economic environment, is likely to be symptomatic 10 of poor underlying institutional quality (see, in particular, Acemoglu et al., 2003) . The main argument here is that economic performance is a direct consequence of economic institutions, so all other factors are ultimately interesting only in the context of how they affect the evolution of such economic institutions. The prediction therefore is that economic performance will be conditionally independent of factors like geography once economic institutions are accounted for.
Two variables are considered as alternative measures of the quality of institutions. The first, ICRG8497, measures the average level of country risk across the years 1984 to 1997. This is a comprehensive measure of institutional quality that aggregates across five variables measuring the quality of the bureaucracy, corruption in government, rule of law, expropriation risk, and repudiation of contracts by government. The second, EXPROP8497, measures specifically the risk of expropriation. Both of these variables come from the IRIS-3 dataset by Knack and Keefer. The decision to use both variables derives from the desire to facilitate the comparability of results across work in the literature. The correlation between these variables is very high at over 0.8.
Finally, building on work by Persson and Tabellini (1994) and others, some researchers have attributed under-development to the multiplicity of population subgroups; defined by differences in socio-cultural factors such as racial features, language, and religion, within a country. Proponents of fractionalization do contend that greater polarization potentially leads to competitive rent seeking 9 See, for instance, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) , Hall and Jones (1999) , La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999), and Knack and Keefer (1995).
10 As Easterly and Levine (2003) put it, "Bad policies would be kind of like a high fever from a bacterial infection. Packing the patient in ice would bring down the fever but does not cure the infection".
activities by groups in power at the expense of society as a whole, leading thereby to a degradation of economic institutions. However, they also argue that fractionalization has important implications for development outside of its effects on the institutionally-driven incentives to produce or divert.
High levels of fractionalization could lead to disagreements over the desirability of the type and level of public goods to be provided leading to a socially suboptimal allocation of growth-critical public goods such as public schooling and physical infrastructure. This could occur because some public goods are viewed as benefiting one group more than another. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) , for instance, find that public goods provision is negatively correlated with fractionalization using census data. Also, since production is typically a joint activity across social groups, the willingness to reach a consensus and to cooperate in production becomes a factor in determining production possibilities.
However, there is evidence that trust does not translate easily across ethnic lines (see, for instance, La Ferrara, 2002, and Glaeser, Laibson, Sheinkman, and Soutter, 2000) . Easterly and Levine (1997) introduced the ethno-linguistic fractionalization index, ELF60, as a measure of ethnic fractionalization. ELF60 measures the probability in 1960 that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethno-linguistic subgroup. Until recently, ELF60 featured prominently as the default proxy choice for fractionalization. In a recent paper, Alesina, et al. (2003) argue that linguistic diversity alone may not adequately capture the different aspects of fractionalization in society. In particular, they argue that the degree to which differences in racial features, language, or religion approximate such fractionalization may vary from country to country. They use data from the Encyclopedia Britannica and other sources to construct three separate measures of fractionalization. The first combines racial and linguistic characteristics (ETHNIC), the second is based on data for shares of languages spoken as "mother tongues"
(LANG), and the third describes differences in religion (RELIG). I employ all four measures of fractionalization in the tree regressions in ways made clear below. Table 1 provides a detailed description as well as summary statistics for proxies for the three classes of fundamental determinants discussed above.
Results
Since GUIDE selects threshold variables with negligible bias, I include in my benchmark regression trees for both development clubs and growth regimes all nine fundamental determinant variables. To affirm the robustness of the benchmark tree structures, I further employ eight different combinations of fundamental determinant variables for each series of regression exercises; i.e., for development clubs and for growth regimes. These eight additional models (Models 1-8) and the benchmark (Model 0) are described in Table 2 . All eight models include the proxy for geographic isolation (LCR100KM). Differences across models are due to different configurations of climate, institutions, and fractionalization variables. Specifically, I interchange the two climate variables as well as the two quality of institutions variables, and use ELF60 and Alesina et al.'s set of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization variables as substitutes for each other across these models.
We hope to observe two forms of robustness by using different combinations of threshold variables. First, we want to affirm that threshold variable selection by GUIDE is in fact unbiased.
We expect that the uncovered structure should not vary dramatically across models employing different combinations of proxies for fundamental determinants. Finally, we want to see if the results are robust to small changes in the data set generated by the inclusion or exclusion of countries due to variations in missing values across variables. The effective number of observations for the development clubs and growth regimes exercises after eliminating rows with missing values range from 84 to 98 for the former and from 150 to 160 for the latter. As mentioned above, we also report 95% confidence intervals for threshold value estimates using Hansen's methodology. While the tree structures generated by GUIDE for development clubs and growth regimes offer us an interpretable relationship between fundamental determinants and economic performance, the confidence bounds provide us with a measure of the uncertainty over the classification of particular countries into each club or regime.
An important caveat to the findings is the difficulty in dealing with issues of endogeneity in the sample splitting context. Caner and Hansen (2004) argued against the credibility of any exclusion restrictions given the problem of model uncertainty (Brock and Durlauf, 2001 ; page 12). I do not wish to overstate any claims in this paper and suggest that the findings be viewed as uncovering patterns in the data rather than asserting statements of causality. However, given that problems of endogeneity plague virtually all studies in the empirical growth literature, I also suggest that these findings may nevertheless be qualitatively no better or worse than those which characterize the broader literature.
Results for Development Clubs
The regression tree results provide robust support for the existence of three development clubs. Figure 2 (a) provides a schematic characterization of these development clubs. There are two main findings. The first is that the quality of institutions, and, in particular, their interaction with ethnic fractionalization, is the robust determinants that drive long-run differences in economic development. That is, the data rejects linearity in favor of multiple (two) development thresholds.
For the group of countries with quality of institutions above a threshold value (EXPROP8497>8.40), ethnic fractionalization has no impact on development whereas for countries that have quality of institutions below the threshold, having levels of ethnic fractionalization above a threshold value (ELF60>0.605) is associated with substantially lower levels of development.
The predicted level of real per capita GDP for the high quality institutions group of countries is almost 14 times that of the low quality institutions-high ethnic fractionalization group.
Further, the low quality institutions-low ethnic fractionalization group enjoys three times the predicted income of the group with high ethnic fractionalization. Interestingly, religious pluralism at least as measured by Alesina et al.'s religious fractionalization variable (RELIG) does not appear to have an important role in explaining divergence.
The second finding is that geography plays no role in explaining divergence in long-run levels of development once institutions and fractionalization are controlled for. Neither factors related to climate nor those related to geographic isolation are identified by the regression trees as being important threshold variables. The results lend partial support therefore to work such as Rodrik et al. (2004) that suggest that once institutions are controlled for, factors such as climate and openness (which we relate to geographic accessibility in this study) are no longer significant determinants of development outcomes.
These results are robust to variation in the set of candidate threshold variables. Table 3 describes, for each of the eight combination of fundamental determinant variables (Models 1-8) discussed above, the partitioning of the joint support of these variables by the regression tree to obtain development clubs. It also lists the predicted per capita income levels for countries in each development club. The results are fully consistent with those we obtained for our benchmark model.
I now organize the discussion of my results in the context of regions of the world. Table 5 gives the breakdown of countries by development clubs and regions for each of the tree regression results (for Models 0 to 8) shown in Table 3 . The number in each cell in Table 5 identifies the corresponding country as belonging to the development club of the same number in Table 3 . Figure   2 (b) shows Hansen's 95% confidence intervals for the first and second threshold splits for the benchmark model (see Figure 2 (a)).
Unsurprisingly, western industrialized economies (Western European countries and their offshoots) are consistently classified as members of the development club with the highest level of predicted per capita income 11 . We are also confident that these countries are correctly classified into this group since they register above the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval for the quality of institutions (EXPROP8497) The exception is Greece which occasionally gets classified along with members of the second highest predicted income club.
fractionalization levels that are close to the threshold value for the low quality institutions-high ethnic fractionalization development club. Western industrialized countries, however, generally have the highest quality institutions compared to the rest of the world. The result therefore lends support to the view that better quality institutions potentially mitigate any negative effects from higher levels of diversity.
The picture for Asia is more complex. A handful of Asian countries, Hong Kong, Japan, the Republic of Korea 12 , and Singapore (as well as Taiwan) routinely belong to the development club with the highest predicted income. They also come in above the 95% confidence interval for the quality of institutions threshold. However, the majority of these are essentially small island states.
Other Asian countries like India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines tend to fall into the development club with the lowest predicted income (the low quality institutions-high ethnic fractionalization club). While there may be some uncertainty over whether the two largest of these countries (India and Indonesia) were correctly classified, the 95% confidence bounds for EXPROP8497 suggest that Pakistan and the Philippines were correctly classified as belonging to that group. Venezuela and Mexico). This holds out hope that policies targeted at improving institutions would result in sizeable pay-offs for these countries. Table 3 indicates that the predicted per capita income for the high quality institutions development club is, on average, roughly 4 times that that of the low quality institutions-low ethnic fractionalization development club.
Finally, let us turn to Sub-Saharan Africa. This region suffers from a confluence of negative factors from having extreme low levels of institutional quality, some of the highest levels of ethnic fractionalization, and a landlocked interior. These problems are to a large extent part of the subcontinent's colonial legacy. Present day African political boundaries did not arise naturally but instead were arbitrarily drawn up during de-colonization. In many cases these artificial borders encompassed groups of people with little in common culturally or sociologically 14 .
The results highlight the influence of Africa's past on its future. With few exceptions, notably Botswana, Madagascar, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are consistently classified into the group of countries with the lowest predicted income levels (the low quality institutions-high ethnic fractionalization development club). And, of the exceptions, the 95% confidence bounds for EXPROP8497 indicate that only Botswana may have in fact been a high predicted income country (i.e., a group 3 country) that was misclassified. In fact, the confidence bounds for EXPROP8497 and ELF60 together provide strong evidence that low-quality institutions coupled with high ethnic fractionalization explains the dismal performance of Sub-Saharan Africa as a region.
What is particularly surprising is that there is no evidence to suggest that climate-related factors are at the root of Africa's under-development. This is in contrast to a large body of work in the literature suggesting such a link. The findings here do not support the conclusion that "the tropics are damned not just, or even mainly, by bad policies, but by difficult inherent conditions [Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger, 1999] ". In fact, the results in this paper point strongly to the possibility that Africa's ills are fundamentally socio-political in nature. In particular, the results agree with those of Easterly and Levine (1997) citing the importance of high levels of ethnic fractionalization in explaining Africa's poor performance. Table 4 (a) details growth regimes for the benchmark (Model 0) and also for tree regressions utilizing each of the eight combinations of fundamental variables (Models 1-8). I find evidence for the existence of two growth regimes. The results, in this case, suggest that institutions are of firstorder importance in determining economic outcomes. Out of the nine trees, seven, including the benchmark, routinely separate a set of high quality institution countries from the rest of the world. Table 7 provides the regression estimates for the nine models as well as ordinary least squares estimates for the standard (unconstrained) Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (MRW) growth regression with homogenous coefficients. The country breakdowns for each model are shown in Table 6 .
Results for Growth Regimes
From the tree regression results in Table 7 , we see that there is substantial parameter heterogeneity across the two growth regimes. Population growth appears to have a much larger negative impact on low quality institutions countries than high quality institutions ones. The coefficient to log population growth (MNGD) is around twice as negative for countries in the former regime compared to the latter. The coefficient for log investment share (MINV) is also much larger for the high quality institutions regime compared to the low quality institutions regime (also around twice as large). There is more ambiguity over the coefficient for log schooling (MSCH25) with some models suggesting that schooling is more important to low quality institutions countries (Models 1 and 3) and others, including the benchmark, that it is more important to countries with high quality institutions (Models 0, 4, 6, 7 and 8) .
The 95% confidence bounds for the threshold split (see Figure 3(b) ) suggest that the classification of countries into the two regimes exhibited some uncertainty but was nevertheless reasonably accurate; a quarter of all countries fell within the bounds. Three features are evident when comparing the country breakdowns for growth regimes (Table 6 ) with those for development clubs (Table 5) . First, we see that countries that were classified as members of the development club with the highest predicted income (high quality institutions group) all conform to the good quality institutions growth regime. Second, countries that were classified as members of the development club with the lowest predicted income (low quality institutions-high ethnic fractionalization group) remained predominantly within the low quality institutions growth regime. The exceptions comprised a handful of Asian countries (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand) that went from the lowest predicted income development club to the high quality institutions growth regime. With few exceptions, Sub-Saharan African countries were classified into the low quality institutions regime. Finally, members of the middle income development club (low quality institutions-low ethnic fractionalization group) were distributed primarily into the low quality institutions regime with the exception of Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Turkey, and Botswana.
There are at least two explanations for the disparity between the number of development clubs and the number of growth regimes. The explanations hinge to a large extent on the structural interpretation of the various regressions trees. If we view the development clubs regression as primarily an exploratory exercise to uncover patterns in the data, then the reason for the disparity in groupings may be attributed to the possibility that countries in the low quality institutions regime are simply not close enough to the long-run steady state distribution for the development club groupings to converge into agreement with the growth regimes.
There is some evidence for this view. The estimates for the coefficient to initial income (MGDP0) for the low quality institutions growth regime are significant 15 , negative, and about a third in absolute value of those for the high quality institutions regime. This suggests that the rate of convergence is substantially slower for low quality institutions countries compared to those with high quality institutions. The large number of development clubs may, therefore, simply reflect transient heterogeneity that will be resolved in the long-run. That is, our results suggest a polarization of the middle-class in the long-run to conform to the findings for two growth regimes.
This story is consistent with findings of "twin peak"-ness in studies on the evolution of the distribution of cross-country income (see, for example, Quah, 1997). As we noted above, we find like those studies evidence for persistence; since all rich countries remain in the high quality institutions growth regime while most poor countries remain in the low quality growth regimes, for growth "miracles"; i.e., those countries going from the low and middle income development club to the high quality growth regime, and for growth "disasters"; i.e., those countries going from the middle income development club to the low quality growth regime.
On the other hand, if we maintain that the development clubs uncovered by our tree regressions do not simply reveal patterns in the data, but are, in fact, delivering long-run predictions for levels of development, then the difference between the number of growth regimes and development clubs may suggest that the MRW specification does better at describing the growth processes of industrialized economies than less developed ones. In particular, the dissipation of countries in the low quality institutions regime into multiple development clubs suggests in this case that there exists (residual) heterogeneity in the growth process of less developed countries that may not be well-captured by the MRW regression specification. If this is true, then more attention needs to be paid to characterizing growth processes for developing countries.
Conclusion
This paper attempts to provide a deeper understanding of how fundamental determinants interact to hinder or facilitate development outcomes for different groups of countries. Such a view is not possible with mono-causal approaches that ignore the possibility of heterogeneity in economic processes. I find that institutions play a central role in accounting for the divergence in cross-country growth experiences. The results for development clubs point further to a key role for ethnic fractionalization in hindering long-run development. The findings suggest that more effort needs to be made to understand the connection between ethnic fractionalization and institutional quality, and their impact on development. The preliminary analysis suggests that sufficiently high quality institutions may be necessary if the negative impact on economic outcomes from higher levels of ethnic fractionalization is to be mitigated. Finally, I find no role for geography in hindering the development of Sub-Saharan African countries. While one has to be extremely cautious in extracting policy implications from growth empirics, the results in this paper would tend to lend support to the view that Africa would be best served by improved institutions and policies to promote nationbuilding across ethnic lines rather than policies aimed at mitigating the effects of the physical environment. There are simply no "magic bullet" solutions to Africa's problems.
Technical Appendix
This section reproduces the key algorithms used in the GUIDE tree regression software. Loh (2002) provides more details about GUIDE as well as a description of other tree generating options within GUIDE.
First, define the following classes of covariate variables:
• n-variable: a numerical-valued predictor used to fit the terminal node regression model and to split the nodes in the tree;
• f-variable: a numerical-valued predictor used to fit the terminal node regression model but not to split the nodes in the tree;
• s-variable: a numerical-valued predictor used to split the nodes in the tree but not to fit the terminal node regression model;
• c-variable: a categorical predictor used to split the nodes in the tree but not to fit the terminal node regression model.
The first two algorithms determine the choice of the splitting variable at each node of the tree.
Algorithm 1: Chi-square tests for linear fit.
1. Obtain the residuals from a linear model fitted to the n-and f-variables, leaving out the s-and c-variables. 2. If the smallest p-value comes from a curvature test, the associated variable is selected to split the node.
For each n-variable
3. Suppose instead that a pair of variables is selected because their interaction test is the most significant among the curvature and interaction tests.
4. If neither is a n-variable, choose the one with the smaller curvature p-value.
5. If both are n-variables, temporarily split the node along the sample mean of each variable; choose the variable whose split yields the smaller total SSE.
6. If exactly one is an n-variable, choose the other variable.
Once a splitting variable (call it j X ) has been chosen, we need to determine the split value for that variable. This is done in the next algorithm.
Algorithm 3:
Choosing the split value.
1. Consider the two partitions of the sample space Y x X defined as follows, To grow a tree, therefore, GUIDE starts with the set of all observations and applies the three algorithms above to find a splitting variable and a split value leaving two mutually exclusive subsets of observations the union of which forms the set of all observations. It then continues to apply this same procedure to each of the resultant subsets, and then to the subsets of observations resulting from those, and so forth iteratively until the number of observations in the subset falls below a certain predetermined value. In our exercises, we take this minimum number of observations to be the default value set by GUIDE. After the tree is grown, it has to be "pruned" in order to avoid over-fitting the data. This is done using Cost Complexity pruning. 6. Locate the tree for which α minimizes the cross-validated SSR.
7. Choose the smallest tree within one standard error of the smallest cross-validated SSR (this could be the tree that minimizes the cross-validated SSR).
For the GUIDE generated trees reported in this paper, V was set to the maximum value available; i.e., the number of observations for each sample. 
*Schematic due to Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman (2001) . Table 4 for the list of countries for each growth regime, and to Table 7 for the tree regression estimates of coefficients to neoclassical growth proximates. Table 1 . "**" indicates significance at the 5% level while "*" indicates significance at the 10% level. Table 1 . "**" indicates significance at the 5% level while "*" indicates significance at the 10% level.
